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i.. SUMMARY
CARE Ill is a rellabillty program designed for the assessment of fault-
tolerant flight control systems. This program was developed by Raytheon
under the direction of Dr. J. J. Stiffler (NASA CR-3566). CARE Ill, Version
3, the most recent Raytheon developed version of CARE Ill, was the version of
the code used for this study.
Under NASA funding and direction, BCS was to verify the mathematical model
and code (Task i) and test stress the program (Task 2).
During this study, several problems with CARE Ill were identified.
problems concerned:
These
• Mathematical Modeling
• Numerical Procedures
• Code Implementation
• Use as a Design Tool
A subset of these problems was identified which cou]d be readily addressed.
A number of code modifications (Tasks 3 and 4) are described in this
document. The resulting code, delivered by BCS to NASA in February 1984, is
referred to as CARE Ill, Version 4. The problems addressed under Tasks 3 and
4 were:
• MARKOV COVERAGE
The coverage module in Version 3 was numerically unstable. For the
special case of a Markov coverage model, one with constant transition
rates, a numerically stable solution was implemented in Version 4 which
is also highly efficient. This solution is described in Section 2.0.
• SYSTEM FAULT TREE
System failure due to spares exhaustion is represented in CARE Ill by a
system fault tree. As implemented in Version 3, the calculation of
system unreliability does not completely represent the system fault
tree. In particular, the contribution of (:overage failure to the
system unreliability may be neglected for somesignificant cases. The
improved fault vector selection procedure for Version 4 is described in
Section 3.
SUBRUNS
CARE [II has size limitations on the critical pair fault trees (70
modules, 20 stages). To permit the handling of larger problems, the
system may be broken up into SUBRUNS, which are combined For system
assessment. As implemented in Version 3, the calculation of system
unreliability from SUBRUN unreliability does not assure a conservative
estimate of system unreliability. This problem is discussed in Section
4.1. An improved heuristic For extracting SUBRUN fault trees From the
system Fault tree for Version 4 is described in Section 4.2. Also, an
improved Fault vector generator was developed which improves the run
time For large problems.
• MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND IMPLEMENTATION
The mathematical model implemented in CARE Ill was verified For non-
transient Faults (CR-166096). Under Task 4, it was also verified for
transient Faults. The code has been modified in Version 4 to implement
the model correctly for transient Faults. The implementation of the
sparing rules has also been corrected. Additional code changes were
also made to improve the computational efficiency. A discussion of
these efforts is given in Section 5.0.
• TEST STRESSING
As part of the assessment of CARE Ill as a reliability tool, two real
fault-tolerant flight control systems were examined. Although FTMP is
a complex system with complications that are not easily represented,
CARE Ill offers sufficient Flexibility to permit a realistic
reliability evaluation. Although SIFT is very simple in design, it is
not amenable to analysis with CARE Ill. This is because SIFT is
composed of an active pentaplex with spares. CARE Ill is designed to
handle only duplex monitoring and triplex voting for Fault tolerance.
Section 6.0 provides a description of the analyses performed.
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2. THE MARKOV COVERAGE MODEL
The Coverage models characterize the system handling of faults. The Single
Fault Coverage model, SFCM, describes failures due to lack of fault detection
in a single module. The Double Fault Coverage model, DFCM, describes
failures due to coexisting Faults on critical pairs of modules. Both models,
presented in NASA CR-3566 and NASA CR-166096, are defined as semi-Markov
processes with exponential and/or uniform transition distributions.
A special case arises when all transitions occur according to constant rates,
i.e., exponential transition distributlons. The coverage models then become
homogeneous Markov processes. The structure of these processes allows for a
larger choice of solution techniques than those proper for Semi-Markov
models.
The Following section describes the _eneral approach for solving a time-
homogeneous Markov process. This framework is referred to in Sections 2.2
and 2.3 in the solution of the Markov coverage models SFCM and DFCM.
2.1 MARKOV PROCESSES
A Markov process is the probabilistic model that describes the dynamics of a
memory-less system, i.e., a system where the future behavior is independent
of the past when the present state is known.
In such processes, transitions between states occur at constant rates and the
probabilistic behavior is given by a system of ordinary differential
equations.
In the Coverage models there are a finite number of states which will be
numbered consecutively; state I is the initial state, i.e., state A in the
SFCM and state BtA2 in the DFCM.
The coverage functions to be computed are some state probabilities and some
intensities of entry into absorbing states. The problem reduces to finding
the former since the latter are linear combinations of these.
PRI_I_)ZNG PAGE BI.,ANK NOT FILMED JI_G_TINTIONALLY BLANK
A general algorithm used to evaluate the coverage functions is composed of
two steps:
I. Evaluate P(t), the vector of state probabilities for non-absorblng
states.
P(t) is obtained as the solution to the system of ordinary differential
equations
d
dt
P(t) = Gl P(t),
P,(O) if i is the initial state,
otherwise,
where G_ is the transpose of the matrix of transition rates between non-
absorbing states.
2. Evaluate p(t), the vector of intensities of entry into absorbing states.
p(t) is obtained as a linear combination of P(t).
p(t) = G2 P(t)
where G2 is the transpose of the matrix of rates for transition from
non-absorbing to absorbing states.
In the next two sections this algorithm is adapted to the characteristics of
the two coverage models and to the specific functions to be evaluated in each
case.
6
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2.2 HARKOVIAN SINGLE FAULT COVERAGE MODEL
Under the assumption that all transitions occur at constant rates, the SFCM
becomes a Markov process with states, transitions, and rates as shown in
Figure 2.2-I.
The Functions required by the Macro Reliability Model as outputs from the
SFCM are
pr(t)
PDp(t)
P_(t)
PL(t)
: intensity of entry into Failure state F,
: intensity of entry in detected as permanent state DP,
: probability of benign _tate B,
: probability of non-benign state B, and
: probability of latent state L,
where B = aggregate of states A, AE and BE;
and L= B
aggregate of states B and
for transient faults,
otherwise.
The desired Functions are obtained as fo]lows:
(i) Compute the state probabilities For the states A, B, AE and _
(P(t), i=1,2,3,4) by solving the Four dimensional system of
differential equations.
d
_ P(t) : G P(t),
dt
where G is given by
[ -(a+_PA+p) B (1-PA)¢c o ]
-8 o (I-PB)¢C
p O -(E+Q) B
o o oL -(E+B)
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(ii) Evaluate the required functions as linear combinations of the
functions obtained in (i). The specific calculations for each
function and each Fault type are shown in Table 2.2-I.
2.3 MARKOVIAN DOUBLE FAULT COVERAGE MODEL
The Markovian DFCM is shown in Figure 2.3-i.
The only function required as output From the DFCM is pod(t): intensity of
entry into the failure state DF.
This function is evaluated as
Poe(t) : L2P1(t) + ;k,P_,(t)
where the vector P(t) = (P1(t), P2(t), P3(t)) is the solution to the system
d
_ P(t) : G Pit),
dt
with matrix G given by
-(BI+Y2) o Bz ]
0 -(B2+YI) B I
a2 _ -(BI+B2)
2.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF MODEL
As shown in the previous section, the coverage model may be formulated as a
system of ordinary differential equations CODE's) for the Markov case. The
single fault model is fourth order and the double Fault model is third order.
Solution of the Markov model as a system of ODE's, rather than as a system of
Volterra integral equations, has several advantages. Software for the
numerical solution of ODE's is available that provides high order, variable
stepsize and numerically stable solutions. These features may be combined to
develop a reliable solution procedure for the Markov case that is highly
9
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accurate, yet efficient. In Task 3, BC$ implemented the GEARB algorithm for
ODE's in Version 4; it has proven to be efficient (up to 200 times faster
than the Version 3 code for solving the same Markov model) and numerically
stable.
Implementation of the ODE solution method for the Markov coverage model
required the addition of eight new subroutines to the COVRGE module and
inclusion of the GEARB numerical integration package (HSGEAR). The Version 4
code provides the user the option to use the Version 3 solution procedure or
the Version 4 method for the Markov case. (Variable MARKOV in NAMELIST set
FLTTYP may be set to I (de?ault) to select the Version 4 method). Figures
A.I-2 to A.I-4 illustrate the structure of the Version 3 and Version 4 code
and show which modules were modified or added.
For the single fault coverage model, subroutine MSNGFN computes the solution
using HSGEAR. Subroutine MSNGFD is used by HSGEAR to evaluate the
derivatives of the state probabilities. AFter the coverage model is solved,
the moments of the output coverage Functions are evaluated by MSNGMT using
HSGEAR. Subroutine MSNGMD is used by HSGEAR to evaluate the integrand for
the moment calculation. For the double fault coverage model, a procedure
similar to the single ?ault case is used to compute the solution and moments
of the output coverage functions using subroutines MDBLFN, MDBLFD, MDBLMT and
MDBLMD.
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3. SYSTEN FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
In Lhe CARE Ill program the system unreliability is computed by the equation:
tP_L e_t
where L is the set of fault vectors e for which the system has Failed due to
spares exhaustion as defined by the _ystem Fault tree. Fault vectors are
generated in sets bY subroutine GNFLTVC in the CARE3 module. For each fault
vector, logic in GNFLTVC determines whether Q(t[_ or P*(t[_ is computed and
summed into the unreliability. For the case of no user supplied system fault
tree, Q(t[C) is computed for any C For which no stage is failed by exhaustion;
otherwise P*(t!_) is computed. This logic is consistent with the assumption
that the default system fault tree is an OR tree, i.e., the system fails if
any stage fails by exhaustion. For the case of a user supplied system fault
tree, Q(tIC) is computed on]y For those C selected by GNFLTVC; P*(tr_) is not
computed for any C. In this case, the sum of P* is computed in CARE3
directly from the minterm file for the ;ystem Fault tree generated by FTREE.
Several problems with the GNFLTVC f_ult vector selection and generation
procedure for the sum of Q calculation where identified in Tasks I and 2:
• Q(tlZ) is not computed for all C ¢ L,
• Q(tIC) is computed for some £ ¢ L,
• Inefficient C generation algorithm.
Review of the GNFLTVC code and test runs indicated that Q(tJO may not be
computed for some C for which the value of Q(ttO is a significant term in the
sum of Q calculation. In addition the user had no control over the selection
procedure. The algorithm for generating fault vectors in GNFLTVC generates
all fault vectors, although Q(t]O may be computed For only a small number of
vectors. The fault vector selection procedure was corrected with the Task 3
modifications and the generation algorithm was improved with the Task 4
changes.
13
3.1 FAUL[ VECTOR PROCESSING
In order to assure that all e ¢ L are processed and that the user may control
which Q(tl_) are ignored as insignificant, two capabilities are required:
• ability to test whether or not a given { E L
• ability to determine when Q(tl_ is small.
The system minterm file generated by FTREE can be used to address the first
requirement. Let the vector
L =(z(x) : x=l,2,..,NSTGES},
where z(x) = 0 or I be a system minterm; then a fault vector e c _ if
e(x)>n(x)-m(x) for all x for which x(x) = [, i.e., { "covers" _. Thus e ¢ L
only if C does not cover any minterm in the system minterm file.
Implementation of this test requires that the system minterms be stored in
core in a data structure designed to test efficiently whether a given fault
vector covers any minterm.
The second requirement can be addressed by choosing a different partition of
the fault vectors into sets for GNFLTVC. Let the sets Ln be defined as
Follows:
N
L = {_': 0 < e(x)_ n(x), _, e(x):= n} n= o,1,2,, NMA X
x=i
where
N = number of stages in the system,
.V
\" n(x)NI,/A X = --
x= I
14
The Ln cover L in the sense that:
NM A
L= U (LnL).
n----O
In addition the values of Q(tl_ are decreasing over the Ln in the sense that
the numbers:
Q,, = max{Q(,'ie) ! e_tL nL)}
II
are monotonically decreasing for n_2.
Thus, if GNFLTVC is modified to generate fault vectors in the sets
Ln, n=O,l, .., Nmax, it is possible to be sure that Q(tl_ is computed for all
C _ L. In addition it is possible to identify an no for which Q(tl{) is less
than a user specified tolerance for all { _ Ln where n_no. Furthermore, the
Fault vectors in Ln may be generated hy a simple algorithm that does not
generate any vectors outside Ln.
3.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF FAULT VECTOR PROCEDURE
Version 3 of the CARE Ill program was _:,dified to implement the fault vector
selection procedure discussed in Section 3.2. The modified code, Version 4,
provides the user the option to use the Version 3 selection procedure or the
Version 4 selection procedure. (Variable IVSN in the NAMELIST set RNTIME may
be set to 3 or 4 (default).) As illustrated in Figure A.I-5, the
unreliabiity for a SUBRUN is computed by subroutine RLSBRN in the CARE3
module. If the Version 3 selection procedure is requested, RLSBRN calls
NFLTVDP and GNFLTVC just as in the Version 3 code. If the Version 4
selection procedure is requested, RLSBRM calls NFLTVDP, then RDSPS to.load
the system minterm data into core, and ?inally GNFLTS to compute the SUBRUN
unreliability.
15
Subroutine GNFLTS generates fault vectors in the sets Ln defined in Section
3.1, calls subroutine PRFLTS to compute Q(tl_e)or P*(tl_ For a fault vector
and monitors the change in size of the sum of Q and sum of P* over Ln; see
Figure A.I-9. The improved fault vector generation algorithm is coded
directly into subroutine GNFLTS. The processing of fault vectors is
terminated after set Ln if the change in the sum of Q For Ln is small
compared to the size of the sum of Q and the change in the sum of P* for Ln
is small compared to the size of the sum of P*. The logic for terminating
the generation of fault vectors is applied for set Ln only for n>2 and if
the user defined parameter LC did not affect the calculation of Q(tl_e)for any
e E Ln. (Parameter QPTRNC in NAMELIST set RNTIME is used to control the
termination of Fault vector processing.)
Subroutine PRFLTS determines whether C _ L or C c _ by calling subroutine
CKSPS which checks to see if C covers any system fault tree minterm. The
minterm data was processed by RDSPS and stored in a data structure in arrays
ITRM and jTRM designed for efficient checking to determine if a Fault vector
covers some minterm. If C E L, PRFLTS calls UNRELQ to compute Q(tl_, and if
c _ PRFLTS calls FPSTAR to compute P*(t!C)
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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4. SUBRUN ANALYSIS
In the CARE £11 program the system may be partitioned into SUBRUN's, which
consist of subsystems that are independent in the sense that modules in
different subsystems are not critically coupled as defined by the critical
pairs trees. For the case of no user supplied system fault tree, the system
unreliability is computed by the equation:
1 - R(t)=
_'[ _' Q(d._)+ _" P*(_)[
s _ _L _ cL
IS ,$ "-'S a:
where Ls is defined by the fault vector selection procedure implemented in
subroutine GNFLTVC in the CARE3 module (see Section 3.). Ls may be
interpreted as the set of fault vectors for SUBRUN-S For which no stage in
SUBRUN-S is Failed by exhaustion. This corresponds to the natural
decomposition of the default system OR tree into an OR fault tree for each
SUBRUN-S.
For the case of a user supplied system Fault tree, the system unreliability
is computed by the equation:
tcL _gt_
where L is the set of fault vectors e For which the system has failed due to
spares exhaustion as defined by the system fault tree and Ls is defined by
the Fault vector selection procedure implemented in subroutine GNFLTVC in the
CARE3 module (see Section 3.). The sum of P* is computed in CARE3 directly
from the minterm File For the system fault tree generated by FTREE. Due to
the problems in the Version 3 Fault w_ctor selection procedure, it is not
possible to give an interpretation of Ls for this case. Furthermore, the
CARE Ill documentation does not specify any procedure For extracting a SUBRUN
Fault tree From the system fault tree.
17
4.1 SYSTEM FAULT TREE PROCESSING
Suppose that the system fault _tree is an OR with respect to the SUBRUN
decomposition, i.e., the system fault tree is an OR over a set of subtrees,
each of which has stages in only one SUBRUN (see Figure 4.1-I). The subtree
corresponding to each SUBRUN may be used to define a fault tree for the
SUBRUN, and then Ls is the set of fault vectors for SUBRUN-S for which the
SUBRUN has failed as defined by the SUBRUN fault tree. Thus the system fault
tree has a natural decomposition corresponding to the decomposition into
SUBRUN's and the CARE Ill estimate of the system unreliability is
conservative.
For the case of a system fault tree that is not an OR with respect to the
SUBRUN decomposition, there is no natural decomposition of the system Fault
tree corresponding to the SUBRUN decomposition; therefore a heuristic
procedure is required. One heuristic procedure is to extract from the set of
minterms For the system Fault tree the subset of minterms that include only
stages within a SUBRUN. This subset of minterms defines a fault tree for the
SUBRUN and Ls may be defined. With this construction, the system Fault tree
is approximated by the OR of the derived SUBRUN fault trees.
This heuristic has the advantage that for the cases:
• a single SUBRUN and any system fault tree, or
• multiple SUBRUN's with the system faul't tree an OR with respect to the
SUBRUN decomposition,
the natural decomposition of the system fault tree corresponding to the
SUBRUN's is obtained and the CARE Ill estimate of the system unreliability is
conservative. It has the disadvantage that in the general case, the estimate
\
of the system unreliability may be non-conservative since some Failure events
are ignored.
18
4b_
LL
LL
_L
UL_
bm
Z
O_
02
o
0
0
E
E
0
U
0
Z
i1
E
e_
o
"7
L_
2_
19
Implementation of the heuristic for extracting SUBRUN fault trees From the
system Fault tree requires the capability of determining when a mlnterm
includes only stages within a SUBRUN. Let the vector
T_ = {T(x) : x=i,2,.., NSTGES}
(T(x) = 0 or I) be a system minterm; then _ includes only stages in SUBRUN-S
only if
dx)= 0
.'c_,SUBRUN- S
If £ passes this test, then the minterm For the fault tree For SUBRUN-S is
defined by:
= {T(x) : x_SUBRUNmS}.
4.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF SYSTEM FAULT TREE PROCESSINO
Version 3 o6 the CARE Ill program was modified to implement the heuristic For
extracting SUBRUN fault trees From the system fault tree. The modified code,
Version 4, uses the heuristic when the Version 4 fault vector selection
procedure is used. For the cases:
• a single SUBRUN and any system fault tree, or
• multiple SUBRUN's with the system fault tree an OR with respect to the
SUBRUN decomposition,
the Version 4 code will provide a conservative estimate of the system
unreliabllity. For a general system tree the estimate of system
unreliability for multiple SUBRUN's may be non-conservative. When the
Version 3 Fault selection procedure Is used, the Version 4 heuristic i5 not
applied because the Version 3 Fault selection procedure does use the SUBRUN
Fault tree. In this case, the concerns about fault vector selection,
described in Section 3, apply to each SUBRUN calculation and the estimate of
system unreliability may be non-conservatlve for any system Fault tree.
20
The extraction procedure described in Section 4.! is implemented in
subroutine RDSPS, which is called by subroutine RLSBRN before the call to
GNFLTS; see Figure A.I-5.
21

5. RELIABILITY NODEL
Complete verification of the CARE Ill model as applied to systems with no
transient faults is given in NASA CR-166096. In that analysis it is assumed
that within aggregate operational states all changes are due to fast coverage
transitions. Intuitively it can be argued that the dynamics within aggregate
states happen instantaneously and so the Macro model becomes a non-
homogeneous Markov process. More precisely, state probabilities are
expressed as renewal integrals which under the above assumptions are
approximated by the forward integral equations of a non-homogeneous Markov
process.
The justification of the macro model for systems susceptible to transient
Faults requires a Finer analysis since the previously used arguments do not
apply.
In Section
discussed.
justified.
5.1, the complications introduced by transient faults are
An intermediate model is defined From which the CARE Ill model is
5.1 JUSTIFICATION OF THE MODEL
Analysis of the coverage model shows that a module with a non-transient fault
is very rapidly removed From the system (deleted from use or causes coverage
failure). A transient fault may also become benign (enters B); the fault
then poses no Further threat and the module enters a fault free status where
it becomes exposed to new faults. A module can experience consecutive
transient faults until it either experiences a non-transient Fault or a
transient fault causes module isolation or system failure.
At the macro level, the degradation of a system is defined by the vector
C = (e([), e(2),...,e(x),...) where e(x) measures the degradation in stage-x.
The comparison of non-transient and transient Faults suggests that behavioral
differences be reflected in the definition of the vector C- In CARE Ill,
e(x) is defined as the number of stage-x modules with a non-transient fault
plus the number with a detected transient fault.
With this definition of the vector _ the assumption of fast dynamics within
aggregate states is no longer valid. The Macro model is not yet justified.
To illustrate this, two Identical systems with three modules and one fault
are analyzed. The Macro models corresponding to these systems are given in
Figure 5.1-1 for a non-transient fault, and in Figure 5.1-2 for a transient
fault. In these figures SFCM and DFCM represent fast transitions, whereas
represents slow transitions. Transitions due to occurrence of a new fault,
slow transitions, occur only across aggregate states in the non-transient
case but can occur within aggregate states in the transient case, e.g.,
transition from fault-free state 0 to actlve state A, both in macro state
G(O).
An intermediate model is defined by introducing the vector _ = (v($),
v(2),..., v(×),...), where v(x) is the number of stage-x modules with latent
transient faults. The states in the intermediate model are defined as
aggregates of Micro model states, as a function of the operational status of
the system and the parameters {, _ Similar notation to that used for the
Macro model is used, e.g., G({, _ denotes an operational state and P(tl_)
its probability.
Applying the structure of the intermediate model to the example, see Figure
5.1-3, it can be observed that only fast transitions occur within operationa|
states. The shortcoming of the Macro model when applied to systems with
transient faults is thus avoided.
5.2 MACRO MODEL RATE DERIVATION
The analysis in the last example may be extended to general systems, and it
follows that the intermediate model is approximately a non-homogeneous Markov
process. The probabilities for failure states in the Macro model, Q(tl{), are
obtained as sums of renewal integrals, corresponding to the contribution of
each of the micro states. More conclsely,
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The first term In (5.2-1) corresponds to coverage failures due to latent
faults or to the interaction of a new transient fault wtth a latent fault.
The second term corresponds to double fault coverage fatlures due to the
Interaction of a new non-transient fault wtth a latent fault.
A conservative estimate of Q(tl_ Is obtained by allowing a larger set of
risks on the operational states that lead to the failure state F(_. This is
attained by evaluating the probabilities and rates in (5.2-I) ignoring prior
coverage failures. This leads to multiple counting of coverage failures and
hence to conservative estimates of the rellabillty. Nevertheless, tight
bounds are expected since fault handling occurs at several orders of
magnitude faster than fault occurrence.
Under the above assumption, modules within a stage can interchange roles
within an operational state. Combinatorial techniques are then possible and
are used to analyze the status of modules within each stage as given in
Figure 5.2-I.
The formula for P*(tl_, the conservative estimate for operatlonal state
probabilities, follows from simple comblnatorlal analyses and Is given as a
product of binomial probabilities. The rates are derived using the principle
of inclusion and exclusion, following Rlordan (1958).
The mathematical expressions of the functions used in the evaluation of
coverage failure probabllltles are:
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t "faulty" modules
IJ latent non-transient
_'-I_deleted
n-{ "non-faulty" modules
v latent transient
ii
n-t-v fault-free
Figure 5.2-1 Status of Modules Within Each Stage
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PR(x) = set of non-translent stage-x faults,
TR(x) = set of transient stage-x faults.
_(_ = a'(tO+ A'(4{)+ X*(4{)
hv_xp)a'(_e_)=_ e(x)t- ._x)
X
+ (n(x).-((x)}hlz(tlxr) }
iePl_zJ
30
tcT_x}
A'(4£(x,:_)) =
.y Z
i [ la(X)
laiZ)
+ (n(x)- e(x)) ho,vitlx p. xr) I
hDF(_Xp,X ;
A'(4_(x,y)) = _ _ P[ P(X);_f(x)l P
p(:} p(y}
hDF(4XP'Y ; (u(y)-- e(y))hDF(_xp,YT) I
p(x) /
icPRI x)
b._-_J=
N(q(x))
(n(x)- e(x)+ _(x))2
bray (_- It) =
Nx, (q( x), q(Y))
(n(x_ e(x_. p(x)) (n(y_ _(y)+ P(Y))
ho,(4,,y;= Y_ 7_ h..(_=,,'_
itPl_z_ je Pl_ y)
31
ho_,(_xp,y r) = \" \
t_PR(z| j_rl_ y)
h_r (dx! ,y j)
x'(tl_)= __ Y_x'(tlt;(_.y);
x y
PIplx); 1 e(xllb=lt(x)-- p(xl I p(x)
ptx}ffi 0
+ (n(x}---e(x).-, l ) HL(t_ xT) ]
X'(t[ e; (x, y))= x(tl yr){n(y} - ely) I 1 - H L (t] yr'l.--X"--X- Pl_(xr. tt e(x)l PIp(.vt 4 efy)l
p{x) pq)'J
where
u_%)
• b yff(x)--p(x),e(y_-p(y)),p(x) gc(dXp)
+ (n(x)-- e{x)) HL(t [ xT) ]
x(tlyr)= Y_ x(tly,)
jtTl_y)
for x=y
_,2,(tl£- !(y),e__)=
x
Xc_)(tl x;e_- ! (y),_e)
t( x)- 1
_(tlg__l_.(y,,e_)= .\(t,xp)(n(x)- e(x)-+, l)[ l- HL(tIxT) [ _,
p( x)= 0
Plp(xt tl e(z_ l i
for x*y
• bx,z(e(x)- p(x)-- I HL(t_x _
-- p(x) + (n(x)- e(x)) ltL (t I xr} [
x(tl=_e-_t(v),e}=._ ._(tlypl(nlyl-e(y)+tilt- Ucttlyr)] . __ _'_elo,_):,_e(_)_ta(sr,tte(y)--tl
ptx) ply)
x_%)
• bx,(e(x)- p(x), e(y)- p(y)- 1 ). HL(I_xp)
p(x) + (n(x)- e(x)) Hc(tl Xr) ]
32
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF NODEL
In tasks 3 and 4, Version 3 of the CARE Ill program was modified to implement
the reliability model as defined in the previous section. The modified code,
CARE Ill, Version 4, correctly implements the CARE Ill sparing representation
defined by the NOP data and the case of transient faults. Additional code
changes were made to improve the computational efficiency of the CARE3 module
and to reduce the use of I/O by the code.
Implementation of the complete CAREI Ill reliability model required
modification of the input (CAREIN), coverage (COVRGE) and reliability (CARE3)
modules of CARE III, Version 3. Figures A.1-I to A.I-IO in Appendix A
illustrate the structure of the Version 3 and Version 4 code and show which
modules were modified or added. The overall structure of the CARE Ill
program was not changed in the modifications. The crucial changes for the
reliability model occur in subroutine CRTLPRS in module CAREIN, subroutine
SNGFLT in module COVRGE and subroutines NFLTVDP, GNFLTVC and SUMMAT in module
CARE3; these are discussed below.
5.3.1 Calculation of the Critical Pairs Counts (CRTLPRS)
In Version 3, the critical pairs minterm da_a For a SUBRUN is processed and
the bx,y Function is computed in subroutine CRTLPRS in the CAREIN module. In
Version 4, the calculation of the bx,y Function is deferred to the CARE3
module and only the critical pairs minterm data for a SUBRUN is processed in
CRTLPRS (see Figure A.I-I). In Version 4, CRTLPRS is completely new and
subroutines GNIQX, RDCPS and GNKXY are new code. The user's NOP data is
processed by GNIQX and arrays IQXNOP ann KQXNOP are established to give q(x)
as a function of e(x)-_(x). The minterm data is read by RDCPS and critical
pair counts are accumulated in array KNT by subroutine GNKXY. The KNT array
contains the Following data:
KNT (i(x), y, q(y)) number of x,y critical pairs that
involve module i(x) in stage-x and
some stage-y module given q(y) in-
use stage-y modules.
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The data stored in the IQXNOP, KQXNOP and KNT arrays is sufficient for the
calculation of the bxoy function performed in the CARE3 module. The critical
pair counts Nx,x(q(x)) and Nx,y(q(x),q(y)) can be easily obtained from the KNT
array.
5.3.2 Calculation of the Counts Nx,x and Nx,y
The evaluation of the bx,y function requires the calculation of the counts
Nx,x(q(x)) and Nx,y(q(x),q(Y)). Since these counts depend only on the critical
pair counts (computed in the CAREIN module), subroutine NFLTVDP in the CARE3
module was modified to call subroutine GNCPS to do the calculation (see
Figure A.I-6). For each possible pair of stages x,y, GNCPS checks to see if
x,y are critically coupled by checking the KNT array; x,y are critically
paired only if
[(X) = L
KNT(i(x) y, n(y))> O.
Array IJSTGIN is used to flag whether or not x,y are critically coupled.
When stages x,y are critically paired, the counts Nx,x(q(x)) and
Nx,y(q(x),q(y)) are computed using subroutines GNNXX and GNNXY and stored in
arrays NXX and NXY:
1 q(x)
N_x(qlx))= 2 \_
z(x) = l
KN'Ili(x),x,q(x))
q{_J
Nl_,y(q(xl, q( y)) = _ KNT(i(x),y,q(y))
z(x)= i
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An improved version of the bx,y data structure and [/0 scheme is used to store
the NXX and NXY arrays.
5.3.3 Calculation of bx,y Function
As discussed in Section 5.2, the bx,y Function depends only on C _ and so it
may be computed before the reliability _odel is solved. Subroutine NFLTVDP
in module CARE3 was modified to call subroutine GNBPS to do the calcula_cion
(see Figure A.I-6). For each possible pair of stages x,y, GNBPS computes the
bx,y Function only if x,y are criticaly coupled as noted in the IJSTGIN array.
When computation is indicated, the bx,y Function is computed by subroutines
GNBXX and GNBXY and stored in arrays BXX and BXY:
t_xx(e(x}- _(x)) = NXX(q(x))
V(x)- e(x)+ la(X)
BxY(e(xr-- o(x), e(y)- _ty_) = NXY(q(x). q( y))
(n(_)--e(x)+plxl}ln(y)--e(y_- o(y))
The values of e(x) and e(y) are defined by C which was selected by GNFLTVC in
Version 3 and GNFLTS in Version 4; q(x) and q(y) are defined by e(x)-u(x) and
e(y)-u(y) using the [QXNOP and KQXNOP arrays; and _(x) and U(Y) are in the
range, O_u(x)_e(x), O_p(y)_e(y).
An improved version of the bx,y data structure and I/O scheme is used to store
the BXX and BXY arrays.
5.3.4 Calculation of Q(_{)
The calculation of Q(tle) is computed by subroutines UNRELQ and FINTGRT in the
CARE3 module:
ft
Q(__e)= t,, K(de-')d_
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Subroutines UNRELQ and FINTGRT were not modified in Version 4.
K(tl_ is computed by subroutine SUMMAT:
The function
K(_= P-(__e)a'(_e_3+P'(_x'(4e_b+\- e,(_e-1(x))x'_'_4e)
w a _
where the first term represents single fault failures, the second term
represents double fault failures with no new fault, and the third term
represents double fault failures due to a new fault. In Version 3, these
terms are computed in subroutines FAPC, FAC and FCYJ, respectively, and FAC
and FAYJ make use of the symmetry in x,y of the bx,y function.
The order of calculation used in FAC and FCYJ introduces several
inefficiencies into the solution of the reliability model: excessive I/O due
to multiple passes through the bx,y data, recalculation of terms which are
independent of C (they are only functions of time) and excessive logical
tests in the inner loops of the calculation. Subroutine GNBPS in module
CARE3 was modified to call subroutine GNTXX and GNTXY to evaluate all terms
in the K(tI{)calculation that depend only on time before the reliability
model was solved see (Figure A.I-8). Subroutine SUMMAT and the bx.y data
structure and [/0 scheme were completely modified to eliminate the excessive
use of I/O and logical tests. (If the number of pairs of critically coupled
stages in the user's model does not exceed 20, then all I/O operations
involving the bx,y data is avoided.) The Version 3 subroutines, FAC, FCYJ,
FBCRTL and FDSCRTL are replaced in Version 4 by subroutines GNFXX, FBIXX,
FB2XX, FBIXY and FB2XY (see Figure A.1-I0).
As discussed in Section 5.1, the transient fault model introduces an extended
interpretation of the fault vector _ In Version 4, the logic in subroutines
GNFLTS and SUMMAT was extended to properly include this revised
interpretation of fault vectors.
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5.3.5 Method of Moments
The calculation of K(tl{) requires the evaluation of several convolution
integrals:
t_(t) = P2 (r) PI (t- _) dr,
o
where P1(t) is a measure of the rate at which a certain class of faults
occurs and P2(z), one of the coverage output functions, is a function of the
interval _ between that occurrence and the entry of the fault .into a
particular coverage state. The numerical convolution procedure implemented
in the CARE Ill module uses the method of moments. The calculation is based
on two assumptions: P_(t) is a much more slowly varying function of time
than P2(t); and P:(t) decays rapidIj to zero. The First assumption is
consistent with the CARE Ill assumption that coverage rates are much higher
than module failure rates. However, the second assumption was not valid for
the coverage output function PDP- TO correct this problem, subroutines
SNGFLT and MSNGFN in the COVRGE module were modified to provide the intensity
PDP as an output instead of Pgp. The CARE3 module was appropriately modified
to compute hDPT from PDP instead of PD_- The overall result of these changes
is a more accurate evaluation of hDp T.
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6. TEST STRESSING
As part of the validation task of CARE Ill, the reliabi]ity of hypothetical
systems was evaluated• The answers obtained compared Favorably with analytic
results. As part of the test stressing, two fault-tolerant systems were
evaluated using CARE Ill; Section 6.1 describes the FTMP analysis, and
Section 6.2 the SIFT problem• Although FTMP presented a complex architecture
For representation, CARE Ill offered sufficient flexibility to approximate
the system. SIFT, although significantly simpler than FTMP, illustrated that
CARE Ill is limited to simplex, duplex, and triplex systems; pentaplex (3-
out-of-5) voters cannot be represented well.
6.I FTMP
The FTMP system (NASA CR-166071,72,73) consists of ten LRU's (line
replaceable units) and connecting buses. Each LRU contains a processor, a
clock generator, a power supply, a memory (slave region) and two bus guardian
units (BGU). For the reliability analysis, the BGU's may be lumped in with
the processor; their failure rates should be added together. Similarly the
memory includes the real time clock, system control register and the I/O
port. There are Four different types of buses: poll (P), receive (R),
transmit (T) and clock (C). There are 5 of each type of bus.
Fault-tolerance is incorporated by trip]ex voting with majority rule (except
for clocks). No single-fault coverage failures should occur. The system is
initially composed of three processor triads with one spare processor, two
memory triads with four memories as spares, and one clock quadruplex with six
spare clocks. The modules in a triplex (quad for clocks) are rotated. At
any given time the processors in a triplex may be from any of the LRU's--
similarly for the memories and clocks.
The P, R and T buses each form a tripiex with two spares. The C bus forms a
quad with one spare• IF no inter-LRU dependence existed, the minimum number
of modules needed for each stage are: processor (5), memory (5), clock (3),
P, R and T bus (2 each), C bus (3).
k' _:_ _" _ ' _-, _,, ".:._T_'__" _ _ L'_> ;_ _i_
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The Failure rates used in the analyses are:
processor (plus 2 BGU's)
memory
clock
power supply
P, R, T and C bus
2.2 x lO-41hr
2.0 x 10-41hr
1.0 x lO-5/hr
1.0 x lO-4/hr
1.0 x lO-5/hr
Dependence arises with FTMP in that if a processor within an LRU fails, no
other modules are affected. If a clock or power supply fails, all the
modules within the LRU may function improperly. When a clock or power supply
are identified as faulty, the entire LRU is deleted from the system. A
Faulty slave region may not affect the operation of the rest of the LRU;
however, if identified as faulty, it will cause the entire LRU to be deleted.
Dependence affects the reliability of the system in two ways, in the
computation of spares exhaustion failure and of coverage failure,
When assessing spares exhaustion, dependence complicates the relationship
between the number of Failed modules and the number of operational modules
remaining. For example, if two processors fail and then two memories fail
(under perfect coverage), the number of operational processors left can be
six, seven or eight. This depends on whether the failed processors and
memories are from the same LRU (eight processors left), different LRU's (six
left), or one LRU with a processor and then a memory failure, one LRU with a
processor Failure and one LRU with a memory failure (seven left).
CARE III does not allow for module interdependency. An added complication is
the functional numbering in CARE Ill, as opposed to physical numbering.
Processor 1 denotes the processor that currently is performing function I;
this in FTMP would be functioning in the first triad. Processor I could be
from any LRU. In particular, processor i and memory I will, most of the
time, be from separate LRU's. A discussion of functional numbering is
provided in Section 3.0 of the BCS Final Report.
As our first-cut model for spares exhaustion, all the modules within an LRU
are lumped together to form a single stage. The combined stage failure rate
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is the sum of the module failure rate_;. Perfect coverage is assumed. This
model leads to a conservative eva_uation (overestimate) of exhaustion
failure. Figure 6.1-1 provides the control information For this FTMP model.
The estimate obtained for the probability of system exhaustion failure is
P'SUM = 1.45 x 10-11.
The unreliability obtained satisfies our requirements (P significantly less
than 10-9 for a I0 hour flight); no further analysis of exhaustion failure is
required. If this conservative procedure did not provide satisfactory
results, a more detailed model could be evaluated. One could let each module
be a stage, and thus represent in detail what combinations of module failures
cause exhaustion failure. The problem with such a representation is that the
system fault tree becomes quite complex and there is an appreciable chance of
user input error. This model still assumes perfect coverage since one cannot
input system sparing rules and the success configuration information (NOP).
For the FTMP analysis this more detailed modeling was not necessary.
Initial information on FTMP was obtained From NASA CR-166071, CR-166072 and
CR-166073. Additional information and assistance on FTMP was provided by Mr.
C. Liciega From NASA-Langley. The failure rate values were based on those
used in the Draper reliability ana]yse_;. The coverage parameters were based
on the FTMP Fault injection study, CR 166073, and a description of how the
system operates.
Exponential transition rates were used For the coverage analyses. The _(t)
transition can be taken as exponential, since the transition of a faulty
module from a latent state to an error generating state can be considered
random in time. The detection rate, 5(t), is certainly based on how often
self-tests are run. There are 37 self-test programs for the processor, clock
generator and bus. A new program is run every 320 milliseconds. Once a
module is detected as Faulty and the e_'ror latches are set, another clocking
cycle is required, 320 milliseconds, before the module can be deleted and
replaced by a spare. Each test program does not detect solely a unique type
of fault. Certain types of Faults w_ll be detected by many of the self-
tests. A uniform distribution does mot appear to describe this operation
well. An exponential distribution was used, such that five percent of the
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$FLTTYPDEL (I) = 1.0E6,
RHO(i) = 0.0,
c (i) : i.o,
IDELF(1) = I,
IRHOF(1) : 1,
IEPSF(1) : I,
CVPRNT = .TRUE.$
$STAGES NSTGES = 5,
N(1) = 10, ( LRU
M(1) = 5,
N(2) = 5, _ P Bus
M(2)= 2,
N(3) = 5, _ R Bus
M(3) : 2,
N(4) = 5, .( T Bus
M(4) = 2,
N(5) = 5, I C Bus
M(5) = 3, !
IRLPCD = 45
SFLTCAT RLM (1,!) 5.3E -4, .- LRU Failure Rate
RLM (1,2) I,OE:
: --59
RLM(I,3) : I.OE -5,
RLM (I,4) = I.OE -5,
RLM (1,5) = I.OE -55
SRNT_ME FT = i0.0,
[TBASE = i,
SYSFLG = .TRUE.,
CPLFLG = .FALSE.$
FTMP PUN WITH LRU TREATED AS A STAGE
1566
6012345
Figure 6.1-I Input File for Obtaining Bound on Exhaustion
Failure with Dependence
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probability was to the right of 38 x .320 milliseconds. With this
distribution, "more of the action" happens early, which represents the
overlap in the self-test programs. Furthermore, the five percent tail to the
right of the theoretica] maximum detection time should lead to a slightly
conservative answer.
The parameter For the exponential distribution is the inverse of the mean.
Using Table l, CR-166073, _ was taken as I/(mean time to detect error - 160
milliseconds), converted to hours. The detection time was adjusted by 160
milliseconds since, on the average, there will be that much delay between
when an error is propagated and when an error Flag is set.
The _(t) transition is From an active e_'ror producing state, AE, to either
detected, identified and reconfigured _;tate, Dp, or to coverage failure F.
The length of time in the state AE is important For assessing double-fault
coverage Failures; only the transition to Dp need be considered. The mean
time for this transition was taken as the sum of the mean times For
identification and For reconfiguration, as given in Table 7, CR-166073, plus
160 milliseconds. The 160 millisecond _djustment allows for the average time
between initiation of error propagation and the setting of error flags.
Using this mean time, converted to hours, provides the exponential parameter
c for the coverage model.
Coverage failure is also affected by dependence. For FTMP no single-fault
failures in theory can occur; double-fault failure must address dependence.
Consider three processors in a triplex (Figure 6.1-2). Any two faulty
processors will defeat the majority voter; thus all pairs of processors in
the triad are critically paired. _ut consider a clock failure in an
associated LRU. This causes faulty processor operation within the LRU.
Hence the clock is critically coupled to the other two processors.
Similarly, the power supply and memory are critically coupled with the
processors (and clocks). In order to represent this dependence, one defines
an equivalence class for each LRU. A double-fault failure may occur if there
is one Fault in two of the equivalence classes. The control file for the LRU
critical pair fault tree is given in Figure 6.1-3. The answer obtained by
this representation is conservative, since some module pairs are incorrectly
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Processor Triad (Pi, Pi, PK)
LRUi LRUI LRUK
Pi
Mi
Q
PSi
Pj
MI
Cj
PSi
PK
MK
CK
PSK
Two Faulty
Processors
Processor
Coverage
Failure
Ct Faulty -_ Pi Faulty
+
Pj or PK Faulty
Processo r
Coverage
Failure
Ci Faulty + _ Faulty
MK or CK
or
PSK Faulty
÷ PK Faulty
etc.
m=_
v
Processor
Coverage
Failure
(with no
direct
processor
failures)
Figure 6.1-2 Dependence Effect on Coverage
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SFLTTYP DEL (i) = 8.87E2,
RHO (I) = 1.91E4,
c (1)--l.o,
EPS (i) = 1.05E4,
DEL (2) = 0.0,
RHO (2) = 8.39E3,
EPS (2) = 1.12E4,
DEL (3) = 8.87E2,
RHO (3) = I.OE6,
EPS (3) = 1.13E4,
DEL (4) = 8.87E2,
RHO (4) = 2.05E3,
EPS (4) = 7.8E3,
DEL (5) = 8.87E2,
RHO (5) = 1.0E6,
EPS (5) = 1.13E4,
NFTYPS = 5,
CVPRNT =
$STAGES NSTGES =
,(1): lo,
M(1) = 5,
N(2) = I0,
M(2) = 5,
N(3) : io,
M(3) = 3,
N(4) = I0,
M(4) = 5,
,(51 ; 5,
,_(_)--3,
N(6) -- 5,
M(6) = 2,
,(7): 5,
M(7) = 2,
,(_): 5,
M(8) = 2,
NOP(I,I) : 9,
NOP(2,1) : 6,
NOP(I,2) = 6,
NOP(I,3) = 9,
NOP(2,3) = 6,
NOP(I,4) = 9,
NOP(2,4) = 6,
NOP(I,5) = 4,
NOP(I,6) = 3,
NOP(I,7) = 3,
NOP(I,8) = 3,
IRLPCD = I$
.TRUE.$
8,
I Processor
I Memory
Clock
IPower Supply
I P Bus
i R Bus
T Bus
I C Bus
Figure 6.1-3 Input File for Estimate of Coverage
Failure, I Subrun
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$FLTCAT JTYP (1,1) : I,
JTYP (I,2) = 2
JTYP (1,3) = 3,
JTYP (1,4) : 5,
JTYP (1,5) = 4,
JTYP (1,6) = 4,
JTYP (1,7) = 4,
JTYP (1,8) = 4,
RLM (1,1) = 2.2E-4,
RLM (1,2) = 2.0E-4,
RLM(I,3) = 1.0E-5,
RLM (1,4) = 1.0E-4,
RLM (1,5) = I.OE-5,
RLM (1,6) = I.OE-5•
RLM (1,7) = I.OE-5,
RLM (1,8) = 1.0E-55
SRNTIME FT = 10.0,
ITBASE = i,
SYSFLG = .TRUE.,
CPLFLG = .TRUE.$
FTMP MODEL IV
1 8 9 9
9012345678
CP TREE FOR MODEL IV
1 60 61 78
ii I0
2 II 2O
3 21 30
4 31 40
5 41 45
6 46 50
7 51 55
8 56 60
61 0 1 Ii 21 31
62 0 2 12 22 32
63 0 3 13 23 33
64 2 61 62 63
65 0 4 14 24 34
66 0 5 15 25 35
67 0 6 16 26 36
68 2 65 66 67
69 0 7 27 37
70 0 8 28 38
71 0 9 29 39
72 2 69 70 71
73 2 21 22 23 24
74 2 41 42 43
75 2 46 47 48
76 2 51 52 53
77 2 56 57 58
78 0 64 68 72 73 74 75 76 77
Figure 6.1-3 (Continued)
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represented as being critically coupled (e.g., processor of LRU 1 and memory
of LRU2). This equivalence class representation, however, makesFor an easy
representation of the LRU dependence eFFect of processor and memorytriads
simultaneously. Using a single critical pair tree, the probability of a
coverage Failure obtained is Q SUM= 6.039 x 10-9. Note that the upper bound
for exhaustion failure, 1.45 x 10-11, affects only the third significant
digit. The problem was rerun using two critical pair trees (two subruns)
with processors, memories and power supplies in the First subrun and buses in
the second (Figure 6.1-4). This reduces the CPUrun time and drastically
reduces the amount of output. The a_swer obtained differed only at the
seventh significant digit. In most of the detailed analyses, subruns were
used, providing highly accurate results at a much lower cost. The
restrictions For the use of subruns are given in Section 4.0.
6.2 SIFT
SIFT operates as a one-stage system which consists of a pentaplex of modules,
plus spares. Within the pentaplex, FauTt tolerance is based on three out of
Five voting. Coexisting Faults on three of the modules within the pentaplex
are necessary to cause coverage Failure of the system. This means that
critical triplets, as opposed to critical pairs, need to be considered when
assessing the probability of coverage failure.
CARE Ill has been suggested as an evaluation tool For such systems by
disregarding Failure probabilities unless enough Faults are present. Q(tj_),
the probability of coverage Failure when _ Faults have occurred, is evaluated
only when _LC, where LC is an input parameter. For a pentaplex, LC is set
equal to 3.
IF transient Faults are possible, then literal triplets can occur even when
_s2, (_ counts transients only when they cause the module to be isolated).
The use of the LC parameter will lead in this case to very optimistic
results.
If only non-transient Faults are possible, the use of LC=3 gives correct
results only in the case of a pentaplex with no spares. If the system
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FTMPMODELIV
1899
9012345678
CPTREEFORMODELIV - SUBRUNI
I 40 61 74
Ii i0
2 II 20
3 21 30
4 31 4O
61 0 1 Ii 21 31
62 0 2 12 22 32
63 0 3 13 23 33
64 2 61 62 63
65 0 4 14 24 34
66 0 5 15 25 35
67 0 6 16 26 36
68 2 65 66 67
69 0 7 27 37
7O 0 8 28 38
71 0 9 29 39
72 2 69 70 71
73 2 21 22 23 24
74 0 64 68 72 73
CP TREE FOR MODEL IV - SUBRUN 2
41 60 74 78
5 41 45
6 46 50
7 51 55
8 56 60
74 2 41 42 43
75 2 46 47 48
16 2 51 52 53
77 2 56 57 58
78 0 74 75 76 77
Figure 6.1-4 Critical Pair Tree for Two Subruns
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consists of one or more pentaplexes and spares, the reliability "estimate
given by CARE Ill is extremely conservative.
Three events contribute to Q(t_) in CARE Ill:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
three latent faults in a pen%aplex;
three latent faults; two of these in a pentaplex;
two latent faults in a pentaplex, one deleted module.
Of the three cases, only the first corrE_sponds to a true coverage failure in
a pentaplex. The last two cases are included in the evaluation of Q(tl3)
since CARE Ill is based on a critical pair type architecture. The first two
events are of the same order, since both cases depend on three latent Faults.
For the highly reliable systems being considered, Fau]t handling is severa)
orders of magnitude Faster than Fault occurrence and the third event is
correspondingly considerably greater t_,an the first two; it will be the
dominating term in the eva]uation of Q(ti3). The corresponding coverage
Failure estimate will then be unacceptably conservative.
As an example, consider a system consisting of one pentaplex and one spare.
Modules are susceptible to a permanent fault which occurs at constant rate
and detection occurs at constant rate 5. If 6 >> _ then
TRUE UNRELIABILITY
CARE Ill UNRELIABILITY
In particular if L=5xlO-4; _=I00 and t=1_ the respective values are 3.7xi0 -13
and 7.4xi0-II.
4g
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L__IINTION_L_

APPENDIX A
This appendix documents the modifications made to CARE [II, Version 3, in
Tasks 3 and 4; the modified program is referred to as CARE [I[, Verston 4.
The first section describes the changes in terms of the "call trees" of the
principal modules of the program. The second section consists of the "design
sheets" prepared for all the modified or new subroutines in Version 4.
A.1 CALL TREE SPECIFICATIONS
In this section an overview of the dif£erences between the Version 3 and the
Version 4 code is presented in terms of the "call trees" of the principal
modules of the program. In Figures A.I-I to A.I-IO, the modified or new
subroutines in Version 4 are indicated by boldface type. The Figures show
that the overall structure of the CARE Ill program was not changed in the
Task 3 and 4 modifications.
A.2 DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
The design of each of the modified or new subroutines in the Version 4 code
is summarized by a "design sheet" presented in this section. These design
sheets were prepared as the first step in the coding of the Version 4
changes. They are an overview of the subroutines; not all computational
details are included. However, they do indicate the overall sequence of
computations and the data needed for and generated by each step in the
subroutine. The design sheets are presented in the Following order:
CAREIN;
- Figures A.2-1 to A.2-5
COVRGE: Markov model;
- Figures A.2-6 to A.2-13
CARE3: Main contro] and computation subroutines;
- Figures A.2-14 to A.2-21".
PRI_CEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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CARE3: Calculatlon of NXX and NXY data;
- Figures A.2-22 to A.2-24
CARE3: Calculation of BXX and BXY data;
- Figures A.2-2S to A.2-2g
CARE3: Calculation of K(ti_;
- Figures A.2-30 to A.2-35
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VERSION-3 VERSION-4
CAREIN CAREIN
BUFBLK
--FTREE
--CRTLPRS
m SUBRUN
L SPLIT
SPLIT
VLDNML
_BUFBLK
m FTREE
CRTLPRS
t GNIQX
RDCP$
L GNKXY
-- $UBRUN
L SPLIT
SPLIT
m VLDNML
FigureA.l-1 CAREINCalITree
[Note: Boldface on this and following figures indicates routines that
have been added or modified,]
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VERSION-3 VERSION-4
COVRGE COVRGE
-- BUFBLK
SNGFLT
DBLFLT
__ PRNTCVG
-- BUFBLK
-- SNGFL T
-- MSNGFN
-- MSNGMT
_ DBLFLT
-- MDBLFN
-- MDBLMT
-- PRNTCVG
Figure A,1-2 COVRGE Call Tree
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VERSION-3 VERSION-4
COV RG E
L_ SNGFLT
COMPFUN
-- .FGSNGL
SFG 12
-- SUMARS
VSTPINT
PREVNRC
[.-- VLTREC
L CNVLINT
-- VOLTERA
L CNVLINT
-- CVLTAR
[-- VOLTERA
L__CNVLINT
-- GENMNTS
-- TMAXSNG
BUFBLK
COVRGE
-- MSNGFN
L HSGEAR
L_ MSNGFD
-- MSNGMT
L HSGEAR
_-- MSNGMD
Figure A.1-3 Single Fault Call Tree
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VERSION-3 VERSION-4
COV RG E
I_. DBLFLT
_ COMPFUN
f FCDBL
__ SUMARS
__ PREVNRC
I__ VLTREC
L CNVLINT
__ VOLTERA
L CNVLINT
-- GENMNTS
__ TMAXDBL
-- BUFBLK
COY RG E
__ MDBLFN
L_ HSGEAR
L_ MDBLFD
__ MDSLMT
L_ HSGEAR
MDSLMD
Figure A.1-4 Double Fault Call Tree
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VERSION-3 VERSION-4
CARE3 CARE3
-- RLSBRN
t NFLTVDP
GNFLTVC
__ FNCK
--BUFBLK
-- RLSBRN
__ NFL TVDP
-- GNFL TVC
__RDSPS
-- GNFL 7"5
-- FNCK
--BUFBLK
Figure A.I-S CARE3 Call Tree
$9
VERSION-3 VERSION:4
NFLTVDP
CAXLAT
L._. FHSFST
CRXFF
L FRXIFF
f FCLAM
FHSFST
PREEXP
m FGST
FHSFST
m FHDFST
FNCK
B PRNTGH
BUFBLK
BUFFOUT
NFL TVDP
GNCP$
f GNNXX
GNNXY
8UFDA T
GNBP$
GNBXX
GNBXY
GNTXX
GNTX Y
8UFDA T
FNCK
BUFBLK
Figure A. 1-6 NFLTVDP Call Tree
6O
GNCP$
GNNXX
GNNXY
8UFDAT
Figure A.1-7 GNCPS Call Tree
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GNBPS
GNBXX
GNBXY
GNTXX
FCLAM
FHSFST
FHDFST
-- FLAM
-- FRXIFF
m PREEXP
-- GNTXY
L FHDFST
BUFDA T
Figure A.1-8 GNBPS Call Tree
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VERSION-3 FAULT VECTOR
SELECTION PROCEDURE
VERSION-4 FAULT VECTOR
SELECTION PROCEDURE
RDSP$
GNFLTVC
-- FPSTAR
-- ARZERO
GNFL"I S
•t FPSTAR
PRFLTS
-- GNBXY
-- UNRELQ
t FINTGRT
SUMMA T
--FPSTAR
-- CKSPS
-- GNBXY
--UNRELQ
t FINTGRT
SUMMA T
Figure A.1-9 GNFLTVC Call Tree
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VERSION-3 VERSION-4
SUMMAT
- BUFFIN
- FAPC
- FLAM
-- FPSTAR
-- FAC
L FBCRTL
I BXYC
FPMUX
- FCYJ
L FDSCRTL
I BXYC
FPMUX
-- FPSTREC
SUMMA T
-- GNFXX
I FPMUX
FPSTAR
-- FBIXX
- FB2XX
- FBIXY
- FB2XY
-- FPSTAR
-- BUFDA T
Figure A.1-10 SUMMATCall Tree
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CAREIN
Read & check User's Input Data
Process System Fault Tree e---FTREE
Loop over Critical Pairs Fault Trees
Process Critical Pairs Fault Tree
Process MINTERM data
Buffer out COVERAGE data (REC, CREC2, CREC3, CREC4)
Buffer out RELIABILITY data (REC, RREC2)
Generate SUBRUN data SUBRUN & SPLIT
Loop over SUBRUN's
Buffer out SUBRUN data (RREC3, RREC4)
Figure A.2-1 CAREIN Design Sheet
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CRTLPRS
Position I/0 Units
Loop over MINTERM subfiles
Read PRBMT, MNTRMV
Read NUNT
Process: ICSTG, KFSTG, LSTSTG, IISTG, IUSTG
Process NOP data _ GNIQX
Read MINTERM data
_m
RDCPS (EOFFLG)
Write KNT data
Figure A.2-2 CRTLPRS Design Sheet
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GNIQX
Loop over stages (x) in SUBRUN
Initialize IQXNOP and KQXNOP arrays for stage
IF default NOP data, THEN
--IP" Loop over kqx (= 1,10) until qx = mx
J _QXNOP(kqx, X) = q(kq_,X) = nx-kqx+lI
ELSE user defined NOP data
--I_ Loop over kqx ( = 1,5) until NOP(kqx,X) = 0
kqm = kqx
IQXNOP (kqx, X) = q(kqx, X) = NOP (kqx,X)
IQXNOP (k,lm,x) = q(kqrn,_) =mx
ENDIF
--I=, Loop over fx-lJx ( = 0,9)
Compute qx defined by nx-lx+ P-x.
KQXNOP (Rx-px, X) = kqx
Figure A.2-3 GNIQX Design Sheet
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RDCPS (EOFFLG)
Initialize KNT array
Loop over MINTERMS
Read MINTERM
Compute: x. m_ Jx, Y, my, jy
For x<-y compute KNT (ix, Y, kqy) GNKXY (x, ix, rex, y,ly, my)
For x >- y compute KNT (jy, x, kcl x)
IF end of MINTERM file, THEN
EOFFLG = .T.
ELSE
GNKXY (y, jy, my, x, ix, rex)
Figure A.2-4 RDCPS Design Sheet
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GNKXY (x, ix, rex, y, jy, my)
IF x=y, THEN
LOOp over qx (kqx= 1,10) until qx<mx or qx<my
Sum:
ELSE x =y
KNT (Jx,x, kqx) = KNT (Jx_x, kqx) + 1
LOOp over qy (kqy = 1,10) u_ltil qy<my
Sum:
ENDIF
KNT(jx, Y, kqy) = KNT (ix, Y, kqy) + 1
Figure A.2-S GNKXY Design Sheet
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MSNGFN
Obtain parameters for fault type
Initialize states and coefficient matrix
Initialize output coverage functions
Loop over time steps (t = IT)
Integrate system state one time step
Compute output coverage functions
Check for steady state
HSGEAR, MSNGFD
Figure A.2-6 MSNGFN Design Sheet
MSNGFD
Compute time derivatives of states
Figure A.2-7 MSNGFD Design Sheet
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MSNGMT
Initialize moments for t = 0 (IT = 1)
Loop over time steps (IT = 2, ITSTPS)
Integrate weighted output coverage
functions one reliability time step
Store moments
HSGEARo MSNGMD
Figure A.2-8 MSNGMT Design Sheet
MSNGMD (t)
Locate t in time array for output coverage functions
Compute weighted output coverage functions
Figure A.2-9 MSNGMD Design Sheet
7_
MDBLFN
Obtain parameters for fault type
Initialize states and coefficient matrix
Initialize output coverage functions
Loop over time steps (t = IT)
Integrate system state one time step
Compute output coverage functions
Check for steady state
HSGEAR, MDBLFD
Figure A.2-10 MDBLFN Design Sheet
MDBLFD
Compute time derivatives of states
FigureA.2-11 MDBLFD Design Sheet
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MDBLMT
Initialize moments for t = 0 (IT = 1)
Loop over time steps (IT = 2, ITSTPS)
Integrate weighted output coverage
functions one reliability time step
Store moments
HSGEAR, MDBLMD
Figure A.2-12 MDBLMT Design Sheet
MDBLMD (t)
Locate t in time array for output coverage functions
Compute weighted output coverage ft, nctions
Figure A.2-13 MDBLMD Design Sheet
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CARE3
Buffer in CVRGAR array
Buffer in TITLE array
Buffer in REC1
Buffer in REC2
Compute KWT from system MINTERM file
Loop over SUBRUNS
Buffer in REC3
Buffer in REC4
Display
Compute Unreliability per Subrun RLSBRN
Compute SRNPSTF if a system fault tree
Compute P* if a system fault tree
Write SUMMARY
Figure A.2-14 CARE3 Design Sheet
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RLSBRN
Convert failure rates to correct time base
Create TRNSFC array
Compute non-__,dependent functions NFLTVDP
IF Version 3 fault generation procedure, THEN
Jl' Generate fault vectors _1_
ELSE Version 4 fault generation procedure
Extract SUBRUN fault tree 4_
Generate fault vectors _
ENDIF
GNFLTVC
ROSPS
GNFLTS
Figure A.2-15 RLSBRN Design Sheet
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NFLTVDP
Compute GFLD
Buffer in KNT data
IF Critical Pairs for SUBRUN,
,L
ELSE
THEN
Pr.ocess SUBRUN for which Critical Pairs are defined
" Process SUBRUN for which no Critical Pairs are defined
ENDIF
Generate NXX and NXY data 4_
Generate BXX and BXY data 4--
GNCPS
GNBPS
Figure A.2-16 NFLTVDP Design Sheet
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RDSPS
Position I/0 units
Loop over all MINTERMS for system fault tree
Read next minterm, T
Extract the MINTERM L for current SUBRUN
tF L does not cover a prevfous MINTERM, THEN
Enter _ in fault tree data structure
ENDIF
Note: The logic in RDSPS and the order of MINTERM's stored on the
system minterm file assures that only a MINCUT set of mmterms is
stored for the SUBRUN fault tree.
Figure A.2-17 RDSPS Design Sheet
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GNFLTS
Loop over fault vector sets Ln (n = 1, 9)
Loop over I _ l-n
Compute P*(tl!)
IF P" (tl _R)> PSTRNC, THEN
Process _0 4--.--PRFLTS
ENDIF
v
IF
l
ENOIF
n>2 and LC did not affect calculation, THEN
Monitor relative change in QSUM and P'suM
IF "small", end processing
Figure A.2-18 GNFLTS Design Sheet
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PRFLTS
IF _R=O, check if I causes systems failure CKSPS (1_)
- Case: t= 0
Initialize display formats
Compute Q(tlO)
Display
UNRELQ
- Case: _B=O._Qdoes not cause system failure
Compute Q(tl_
Display
- Case: __=0, i causes system failures
UNRELQ
Compute P*(t,_
Display
4----- FPSTAR
Figure A.2-19 PRFt.TS Design Sheet
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CKSPS (0)
IFAIL = 0
IF _0==0, THEN
IFAIL = 1
IF $UBRUN fault tree, THEN
IF
ENDIF
does not cover any minterm, THEN
IFAIL = 0
ENDIF
ENDIF
Note: If there is no user supplied system fault tree or if the
extracted set of MINTERM$ for a SUBRUN is empty, the
SUBRUN fault tree is assumed to be an OR tree.
Figure A.2-20 CKSPS Design Sheet
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UNRELQ
Loop over t ( = IT)
Compute K(tl_
Compute Q(tl_
SUMMAT
FINTGRT
Figure A.2-21 UNRELQ Design Sheet
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GNCPS
Position 1/O units
v Loop over x
IF x,xisc.p., THEN
Compute N_x
Write NXX data
ENDIF
GNNXX (x)
v
IF NSTGS >l, THEN
Loop over y
Loop over x < y
IF x,yarec.p., THEN
Compute N_y
Write NXY data
ENDIF
GNNXY (x,y)
Ir
ENDIF
Figure A.2-22 GNCPS Design Sheet
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GNNXX (x)
Loopoverqx(kqx = 1,10)
Compute Nxx (qx)
Figure A.2-23 GNNXX Design Sheet
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GNNXY (x,y) [assume x <y]
Loop over qy (kqy = 1, 10)
Loop over qx (kqx = 1, 10)
Compute Nxy(qx,qy)
v
v
Figure A.2-24 GNNXY Design Sheet
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GNBPS
Position I/O Units
r-'--'-_C Loop over x
ompute functions of time
IF x,x is c.p., THEN
Read NXX data
IF non-zero BXX data, THEN (nx__2)
Compute B_x
ENDIF
ENOIF
Write BXX data
IF NSTGS > 1, THEN
Loop over y
Loop over x<y
IF x,ylsc.p., THEN
Read NXY data
IF
1
ENDIF
ENDIF
non-zero BXY data. THEN (nxZ 1 and ny_ 1)
Compute Bxy
Compute functions of time
Write BXY data
ENDIF
Figure A.2-25 GNBPS Design Sheet
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GNTXX (x)
GNBXX (x)
GNBXY (x,y)
GNTXY (x,y)
GNBXX (x)
LOOpovergx ( = O, Ix)
mpute Bxx (IJx)
Figure A.2-26 GNBXX Design Sheet
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GNBIXY (x,y) [Assume x<y]
Loop over py ( = 0, _ty)
-_ Loop over p_ ( = O, tt.)
I Compute Bxy (px,lJy)L
i
Figure A.2-27 GNB×Y Design Sheet
87
GNTXX (x,y)
Loop over all time steps (t = IT)
Loop over all fault categories, _ (i = 1,5)
Compute r(t_xi)
Compute r (t_x)
Loop over al! time steps (t = IT)
Loop over all fault categories, _ (i = 1,5)
Compute )_(t_xi), Z _p, Y. _.T
Compute HL (t_), Y. Hqo' £ HLT
Compute h; (l_xJ, Y. hr_, Z hFT
Compute HB (tJx,), E Hep, _ HgT
Compute ( 1-£ HLT) £ _p, ( 1"£HLT) £ _,T
Compute He (t, x,)
Loop over all time steps (t = IT)
YLoop over all fault categories, _ (i = 1,S)Compute ho_ (t_x,), £ hoFp, T. hOFT
Figure A.2-28 GNTXX Design Sheet
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GNTXY (x,y)
Loop over all time steps (t = IT)
Case: x,y
Loop over all faL/t categories, xi (i = 1,5)
Loop ow_r all fault categories, y_ (j = 1,5)
Comput(. _ hop (t_yj, xi), _- hopp, £ hop T
Case: y,x
Loop over atl faL_lt categories, yj (j = 1,5)
Loop ow_r all fault categories, x_(i = 1,5)
Comput_ hop (tlx, yj), T.hopp, T. hop T
Figure A.2-29 GNTXY Design Sheet
SUMMAT (tl_
Position I/0 units, Process IS, Initialize
Loop over x
Read BXX data
Add _t(1)terms to SUMA
Loop over x
Generate x functions
Read BXX data
IF x,x asc.p., THEN
IF non-zero 8XX data, THEN
Add .\(2) term to SUMA
Add I_ term to SUMA
Add .\(2) term to SUMC
4-- GNFXX (t,x)
(nx> 2 and J_x_> Ecx)
FB2XX (x)
_1_ FBlXX (x)
FB2XX (x)
ENDIF
ENDIF
Figure A.2-30 SUMMAT Design Sheet
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IF NSTGS > 1, THEN
Loop over y
Loop over x<y
IF x,y is c.p., THEN
Read BXY data
IF non-zero 8XY data, THEN (nx_>1 and n,/Z 1
Add ,_2} term to SLJMA
Add IJ term to SUMA
Add k ,2) term to SdMC
and gx_ Rc_,and 0y_ gCy)
FB2XY (x,y)
FBIXY (x,y)
FB2XY (x,y)
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDIF
m_
Compute P* (tI.Q),a'(tlf)
Compute K(tl.°), store in SUMK(IS)
Figure A.2-30 SUMMAT Design Sheet (Continued)
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GNFXX (t, x)
IF Ox -> 1, THEN
Compute _l-l(x)
Compute P* (tl__.-!(x))
Compute nx-0_÷ 1
Compute PSLX (x) = (nx-Bx+ 1), P" (tl£-! (x))
Loop over i = 1,2
Compute _fx= ltx- i + 1
Loop over Llx= 0, iOx
Com4oute il_= i0x+ 1
Compute FPMX (x, IJx,i.o) = _(t,_liO.)
ELSE
ENDIF
Compute FPMX (x, l, 1) = P (t,010)
Figure A.2-31 GNFXX Design Sheet
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FBIXX (x)
Case: P,x,x
SUMX = O.
Looo over ].tx ( = O,Rx)
SUMX = SUMX + Bxx (_x-IJxJ* P(t,IJxi-°x)* _* rlJ_-l)
FB1XX = SUMX
Case: T,x,x
SUMX = O.
Loop over Ux (= O,_x)
I SUMX = SUMX + Bxx(_,'p,J*P(t.pJ_l =_t.
E
FB1XX = (nx-.°x)*SUMX
Figure A.2-32 FBIXX Design Sheet
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FBIXY(x,y)
Case:P,x,y
SUMY=O.
Loop over Uy( = O,fy)
SUMX = O.
Loop over Ux ( = O,l_)
SUMX = SUMX + Bxy (B_-I.I=, By-I.tyJ * P(t,l.lxiRx) * I_
SUMY = SUMY + SUMX * P(t,l.lylOy) * Uy
FB1XY = SUMY
Case: P,y,x
SUMX=O.
LOOp over Ux ( = 0,R_)
SUMY = O.
Loop over Uy ( = O,Jty)
SUMY = SUMY + Bxy (J_y'Uy, B.'Ux)* P(t,UytOy)* gy
SUMX = SUMX + SUMY * P(t,uJO,.) * I.ty
FBIXY = SUMX
Figure A.2-33 FB1XY Design Sheet
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Case: T,x,y
SUMY = O.
-_ Loop over IJy ( = O,Ry)
SUMX = O.
Loop over I.Ix( = O,R_)
SUMX = SUMX + Bxy (_x-_lx, Ry'_Jy)* P(t,IJxiRx_
SUMY = SUMY + SUMX * P(t,_ly_gy) * l_y
FB1XY = (n_-Rx) * SUMY
Case: P,y,x
SUMX = O.
Loop over IJ_ ( = O,RJ
SUMY = 0
Loop over tJy ( = O,Jty)
SUMY = SUMY + Bxy (_y-lJy, J_x'lJx) * P(t,l, tyiRy)
SUMX = SUMX ÷ SUMY * P(t,|Lylgy) * l_y
FB1XY = (ny-Ry) * SUMX
Figure A.2-33 FBIXY Design Sheet (Continued)
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FB2XX (x)
-- Case: P,x,x
Increment Ix
5UMX = 0.
Loop over IJx(= O,f_)l
.J SUMX = SUMX + Bxx(gx-Uxi * P(t,U_jOx) * Ux
[
FB2XX = SUMX
-- Case: T,x,x
Increment 0x
SUMX = O.
Loop over IJ_ ( = O,J_)
SUMX = SUMX + B,_x(Ox'_xJ"P(t,l.l,,_)
FB2XX = (nx-g x) * SUMX
Figure A.2-34 FB2XX Design Sheet
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FB2XY (x,y)
Case: P,x,y
Increment Oy
$UMY= O.
Loop over IJy( = O,Jty)
SUMX = 0.
Loop over IJx ( = O,Ox)
SUMX = SUMX * Bxy (Jtx-I-lx, Oy°lJy) * P(t,LlxiOx) * P.
SUMY = SUMY + SUMX * P(t,layJy)
FB1XY = SUMY
Case: P,y,x
Increment _,
SUMX=0
Loop over IJ, i = 0,Jt_)
SUMY = 0.
Loop over t_y ( = 0,Jty)
SUMY = SUMY + Bxy (gy-IJy, Jtx-IJ_) * P(t,]Jyigy) * IJy
SUMX = SUMX + SUMY * P(t,_ly_0y)
FBIXY = SUMX
Figure A.2-35 FB2X v Design Sheet
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Case: T,x,y
Increment Oy
SUMY =0.
Loop over Uy ( = 0,0y)
SUMX = 0.
Loop over Ux ( = O.Rx)
SUMX = SUMX + Bxy (Ox-I.lx, "#y'My)* P(t,P.jBx)
SUMY = SUMY + SUMX * P(t, Uy_ly)
FBIXY = (nx-R.) * SUMY
Case: P,y,x
Increment gx
SUMX = O.
Loop over 1.t,( = O._g.)
SUMY = O.
Loop over Uy(= O,Oy)
SUMY = SUMY + Bxy (J_y'gy, Bx'IJx)* P(t,Uy_fy)
SUMX = SUMX + SUMY * P(t,UylOy)
FB1XY = (ny-By) * SUMX
Figure A.2-35 FB2XY Design Sheet (Continued)
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